| 井出 隼人 | M, 2回目発表 | 情報セキュリティ工学 | 林 優一, | 岡田 実, | 安本 慶一, | 藤本 大介 |
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title: A Study on Electromagnetic Information Leakage Induced by Hardware Trojans Through Cable Geometry Manipulation
abstract: The electromagnetic (EM) information leakage threat, which reconstructs information from EM waves radiated by electronic devices, has been reported. Traditionally, devices with weak EM emissions were considered outside the scope of the threats. However, an attack has been proposed in which malicious circuit components are implemented inside the device to enhance EM emissions, and information leakage is induced by irradiating EM waves with the specific frequency from the outside device. The attack requires the implementation of additional circuit components and irradiation of EM waves, making it possible to detect attacks by measuring the device's electrical characteristics or monitoring EM waves around the device. In contrast, if an attack that does not require additional circuit components and EM irradiation is possible, it may be difficult to detect using conventional methods. Therefore, this study demonstrates the feasibility of a threat that increases the intensity of EM wave radiation by manipulating the geometric structure of information transmission cables, inducing information leakage. In experiments, the proposed method, applied to cables with manipulated geometric structures, showed an expanded range of information obtained compared to the original cables. | ||||||
| 大田 恵冶郎 | M, 2回目発表 | 情報セキュリティ工学 | 林 優一, | 岡田 実, | 安本 慶一, | 藤本 大介 |
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title:A Study on the Evaluation of Hiding Method for Electromagnetic Information Leakage from Display Devices
abstract:Screen information leakage threats have been reported through unintentional electromagnetic (EM) emissions caused by the operation of display devices. To counter this threat, hiding methods have been proposed that suppress variations in EM emission characteristics by manipulating font and background colors according to the screen content, thereby making it difficult to reconstruct information. However, previous studies have demonstrated that even under conditions where hiding is theoretically expected to be effective, the countermeasures may fail in actual measurement environments. This study investigates the factors contributing to the failure of such hiding countermeasures based on an EM leakage model consisting of source, path, and antenna. Specifically, variations in the emission characteristics of individual signal transmission lines—factors not considered in conventional theoretical models—are hypothesized to be the failure. This presentation introduces a measurement setup that enables the evaluation of EM emissions from each transmission line and assesses the relationship between emission intensity differences and the effectiveness of hiding countermeasures. language of the presentation:Japanese | ||||||
| 阿部 虹稀 | D, 中間発表 | 情報セキュリティ工学 | 藤本 大介, | 岡田 実, | 安本 慶一, | 林 優一 |
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title: A Study on Countermeasure Techniques Focusing on Electrical Changes Induced by Physical Attacks Against Hardware
abstract: Ensuring the security of hardware, which serves as the root of trust in information systems, is important. Since hardware handles information in electrical signals, physical attacks, such as signal measurement, signal control, and tempering, have been reported. These attacks can be categorized into electromagnetic (EM) measurement, EM interference, and circuit modification. Countermeasures techniques to the threats have been proposed based on the mechanisms of each threat. However, if changes in electrical characteristics that occur during physical attacks can be detected, it may become possible to develop countermeasures that differ from conventional techniques. This study develops unified countermeasures against physical attacks on hardware by detecting and analysing electrical variations that occur during such attacks. language of the presentation: Japanese | ||||||
| 冨永 愛 | M, 2回目発表 | 情報セキュリティ工学 | 林 優一, | 安本 慶一, | 井上 美智子, | 藤本 大介 |
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title:The Impact of Security Breaches on Stock Prices Based on Company Size and Industry
abstract: As companies advance their DX (Digital Transformation) efforts, security breaches have become increasingly common, heightening security risks for businesses. These breaches can have diverse impacts, including economic losses, reputational damage, and legal liabilities. Consequently, it is essential for companies to properly assess the effects of security breaches and implement appropriate countermeasures. Previous studies have proposed methods for evaluating the impact of security breaches on companies through stock price fluctuations. These studies have demonstrated that the stock market’s reaction to a breach varies depending on factors such as company size and industry. Furthermore, research focusing on Information Security Management System (ISMS) certification has shown that the presence or absence of certification also influences the degree of stock price decline following a breach. However, despite such findings, many evaluations still apply a uniform assessment across all companies, without fully accounting for differences in company characteristics. Therefore, this study aims to classify companies by size and industry and assess how ISMS certification affects stock price responses to security breaches within those classifications. language of the presentation:Japanese | ||||||