| Tv(Abstract)F |
Algorithmic game theory is the study of interdisciplinary topics that
lie in the intersection of computer science and microeconomics. In
this talk, we introduce one subfield of algorithmic game theory, which
is called automated mechanism design. Automated mechanism design
studies how to use computational techniques to design economic
mechanisms (rules for social decision problems). This talk does not
assume any prior knowledge in game theory or mechanism design, as we
will introduce all the basic concepts in the beginning of the talk.
Besides the basic concepts, we will also focus on one main case study,
as detailed below:
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among
multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers
are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible
mechanisms that do not rely on payments, with the goal of maximizing
expected social welfare. We introduce an artificial payment system,
which enables us to construct repeated allocation mechanisms without
payments based on one-shot allocation mechanisms with payments. We
evaluate mechanisms based on their competitive ratios. Our resulting
mechanisms are proved to achieve very high competitive ratios, which
implies that for repeated allocation, artificial payments may be used
to replace real monetary payments, without incurring too much loss in
social welfare.
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| uาช๐(Biography)F |
Dr. Guo is a Lecturer at the School of Computer Science, University of
Adelaide. He has a strong publication record on algorithmic game
theory and multiagent systems. His work appeared in top computer
science journals (e.g., Artificial Intelligence and Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research), top computer science conferences
(e.g., AAAI, IJCAI, AAMAS, EC), and top economics journal (Games and
Economic Behavior). Dr. Guo served as a Senior Program Committee
member for IJCAI 2015 (CORE A*). He continuously served on the program
committee of many other CORE A* level computer science conferences,
including AAAI, IJCAI, AAMAS, and WWW. Dr. Guo has been frequently
invited to present his work by international colleagues from both
computer science and economics (e.g., DIMACS, CWI, Microsoft, Chinese
Academy of Science, Adam Smith Business School at University of
Glasgow, Southampton University, Kyushu University). His research on
gComputationally Feasible Approaches to Automated Mechanism Designh
was selected as one of the two runner-ups for the prestigious
IFAAMAS-10 Victor Lessor Distinguished Dissertation Award (an annual
award for the best Ph.D. Dissertation in the field of multiagent
systems). Dr. Guo's previous project on revenue-maximizing Internet
advertisement auctions was funded by Microsoft Research. The project
produced results that help maximize revenue for Internet advertisement
publishers and for cloud computing providers. Dr. Guofs work on VCG
redistribution mechanisms (resource allocation to maximize system
utility) is one of the most prominent successful stories of using
computational techniques to deliver new economics results.
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